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COMMENTS
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in
Object Code in ROM
I. Introduction
Due to technological innovations, the computer industry has ex-
perienced tremendous growth in the last decade. Computers are fast
becoming a fixture in many homes and offices. This expansion in the
computer market has been accompanied by an even greater demand
for software that will allow computers to perform various functions.
The development of software requires substantial investments, yet
the final product may be duplicated easily and inexpensively by con-
sumers and competitors in the software industry.' These circum-
stances have made protection of software manufacturers' proprietary
rights a major concern.
In an effort to protect against software piracy, manufacturers be-
gan marketing their programs in an unintelligible form-in object
form in ROM. 2 Technological advances have since made it possible
for competitors to copy the underlying program embodied in the
ROM. Moreover, courts3 and commentators 4 have expressed uncer-
tainty whether copyright protection extends to such forms of com-
puter programs. Recent decisions, however, hold that copyright
I See Note, Software Piracy and the Personal Computer: Is the 1980 Software Act Effective?, 4
COMPUTER L.J. 171, 174-75 (1983-84).
2 See Note, Copyright Protectionfor Firmware: An International View, 4 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMp. L. REV. 473, 476 n.14 (1981) (disseminating programs in Object code form discour-
ages piracy).
3 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982), rev'd and remanded, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690
(1984); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1067-68 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
1979) ("the 1976 Act applies to computer programs in the flowchart, source, and assembly
phase but not in the object phase"), afdon other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). See
also In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (copy-
right law does not necessarily prevent others from copying material embodiment of a pro-
gram); In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(copyright notices on software protect underlying source program but not object
program).
4 See Koenig, Software Copyright: The Conflict Within CONTU, 18 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 340 (1980). Compare Stem, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980
Act Do Anything for Object Code, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 1, 1 (1981) (object code not copyrightable)
with Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1723, 1732 (1983)
(object code copyrightable).
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protection extends to all forms of computer programs regardless of
their function or format. 5
This comment traces the development of copyright law in rela-
tion to computer programs, including the 1976 copyright revision
and the 1980 copyright amendments. It surveys judicial interpreta-
tion and application of copyright law to computer programs. Finally,
this comment analyzes the arguments against copyrightability of
computer programs in ROM and concludes that Congress intended
to protect such works.
II. The Creation of a Computer Program
To understand the applicability of copyright to computer pro-
grams, it is helpful to examine how a program is created. A com-
puter program goes through four generations before it can be used
by a computer: flowchart, source code, object code, and object form.
A program begins as an idea of how to solve a problem or perform a
function. 6 After reviewing the program's objectives and specifica-
tions, the programmer designs the program's logical structure. The
programmer prepares a flowchart or schematic diagram that uses
words and symbols to illustrate the precise sequence in which each
operation is to be performed and to outline the program's essential
details and interrelationships. 7
The second step in program development is the translation of
the flowchart into a set of specific instructions using one of the
"4source languages," developed for communication between the
5 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983), afd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Hubco Data Prods. v. Management
Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. Idaho 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill.
1982), afd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); GCA Corp. v.
Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers,
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), afd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
6 M. GEMIGNANI, LAW AND THE COMPUTER 80 (1981).
7 Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 329, 341-42 (1982-83) ("flowchart is the first expression of the programmer's
ideas on the problem that will become a program"). See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 53 n.127 (1978) ("flowchart
is a graphic representation for the definition, analysis or solution of a problem in which
symbols are used to represent operations, data flow, or equipment.") [hereinafter cited as
CONTU FINAL REPORT]. See also Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038,
1040 (7th Cir. 1980) (steps in development of a computer program).
Today, programmers rarely create flowcharts to memorialize the program's design.
Instead they write a "prolog" which is an English-language recitation of the structure and
function of the program. MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software-An Update and Practical
Synthesis, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1983).
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programmmer and the computer.8 The programmer may code the
program into a higher level language, such as FORTRAN, COBOL,
or BASIC, that employs English-like words and syntax, or a lower
level symbolic assembly language such as BAL, AUTOCODER, or
SPS that consists of alphanumeric labels. 9
The program written in source code language is commonly re-
ferred to as "source code" or "source program."' 0 A source pro-
gram is a series of formalized statements or instructions that direct
the computer to perform a sequence of operations to solve a prob-
lem or produce a desired output."I When choosing the source code
language statement to implement the program, the programmer
selects those statements that will most efficiently execute the logical
steps required by the design. 12 After the program has been coded, it
is stored on a machine-readable medium such as punched cards,
magnetic tape, or floppy disks. 13
A computer, however, cannot understand a program written in
source code; it can only execute machine-language instructions.
Therefore, the source code statements must be translated in
machine-readable object code before they can be executed. 14 The
conversion process varies with the form of the source code language.
A compiler program is used to translate higher-level languages into
object code. This is not usually a one-to-one translation; it is gener-
ally a multistage process in which one line of higher-level coding is
compiled into many lines of machine-language instructions.' 5 In
contrast, lower-level assembly language corresponds directly to ob-
ject code on a one-to-one basis. A computer program called an as-
sembler or assembly program is used to translate each symbolic
language instruction into its equivalent machine-language
8 Note, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc.: Duplication of Computer
Program in Object Form Is Copyright Infringement, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 399, 401 (1983).
9 R. VERZELLO & J. REUTrER, III, DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS 260
(1982); R. KRUTZ, MICROPROCESSORS AND LOGIC DESIGN 269 (1980).
10 See CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 53. "A source code is a computer pro-
gram written in any of several programming languages employed by computer program-
mers." Id. at 53 n.127.
II Stern, supra note 4, at 2.
12 MacGrady, supra note 7, at 1035-36.
13 A "floppy disk" is a flexible magnetic disk that stores information in concentric
tracks of tiny magnetized regions. Note, supra note 4, at 1725 n.20. At this stage, the
computer program is an exact copy of the author's original expression that has merely
been electronically recorded in a manner similar to videotape or sound recording. Note,
supra note 1, at 178.
14 SeeJ. BOYCE, MICROPROCESSOR AND MICROCOMPUTER BASICS 266 (1979); G. SHELLY
& T. CASHMAN, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER PROGRAMMING STRUCTURED COBOL 2.21
(1977). "An object code is the version of a program in which the source code language is
converted or translated into the machine language of the computer with which it is to be
used." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 54 n.128.
15 Laurie & Everett, Protection of Trade Secrets in Software Distributed Only in Object Form:
The Case for Reverse Engineering, in COMPUTER SOFrWARE 1984: PROTECTION AND MARKETING
501, 509-10 (P.L.I. 1984).
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instruction. 16
A computer does not record numbers or letters; it stores data
electronically by sensing the presence or absence of electronic im-
pulses generated by the program. The basic unit for storing data in a
computer is the bit (binary digit), which can assume one of two possi-
ble values: "on" and "off." The computer's electronics identify the
status of each bit, which is the basis for storing data in the main
computer. 17
Data is represented in binary code by a series of eight bits.
These combinations, commonly known as bytes, are used to repre-
sent all the numbers, letters, and symbols needed to process data on
a computer system.18 The binary language of object code in its writ-
ten version uses a series of "ones" and "zeroes" that correspond to
the "on" and "off" electrical impulses that the computer will sense
to execute the program. Thus, each phase of the program
(flowchart, source program, object program) is an expression of the
same list of instructions. 19
After being translated into object code, a computer program
may be stored in a number of different medias such as printed form,
punched cards, magnetic disks, silicon chips, or bubble memories. 20
A common device for internal storage of a computer program is the
ROM (Read Only Memory). A ROM is a silicon chip comprised of
thousands of semiconductor transistors enclosed in an outer package
that is plugged into the circuit boards of the computer.21 The ROM
contains programming instructions, commonly called microcode,
that are imprinted on the chip by photochemical process or electri-
cally when it is manufactured. 22 A computer can only read the pro-
gram embodied in a ROM, it cannot be reprogrammed. A ROM is
16 Id. at 510. See P. FREEMAN, SOFTWARE SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES 437 (1975).
17 R. ARNOLD, H. HILL & A. NICHOLS, MODERN DATA PROCESSING 115-29 (3d ed.
1978).
18 R. KRUTZ, supra note 9, at 4.
19 See Note, supra note 8, at 401. For more information on the various phases of
computer programs, see Pope & Pope, Protection of Proprietaty Interests in Computer Software,
30 ALA. L. REV. 527, 530-31 (1978-79); Keplinger, Computer Intellectual Property Claims: Com-
puter Software and Data Base Protection, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 461, 464.
20 Bubble memories store data in very small regions of reversed magnetization in
garnet that appear as bubble-like disks when viewed under polarized light. See Lin &
Sander, Contiguous-Element Memories Increase Storage Tenfold, I.E.E.E. SPECTRUM 30 (Feb.
1981).
21 Variations on the ROM include the PROM, a "programmable read only memory,"
which can be obtained as a "blank" and coded permanently by the user, and the EPROM,
an "erasable programmable read only memory," which can be coded by the user in a per-
manent form and subsequently erased and reprogrammed. PROMs and EPROMs can be
programmed at any time by a special device such as a ROM programmer or ROM duplica-
tor, but not by the computer. D. McGLYNN, PERSONAL CoMPUrTING 20-22 (1979); R.
VERZELLO &J. REUTrER, III, supra note 9, at 181; Koenig, supra note 4, at 366-67.
22 "[O]bject code is not the ROM itself, but is stored in the ROM, much the same way
it could be stored on a magnetic storage disk. While a ROM physically appears to be
mechanical part, it is no more mechanical than a magnetic storage disk or a phonograph
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considered to be a nonvolital storage device; when the computer is
turned off; the ROM will retain the information stored in it.23
The copyright on a program stored in a ROM may be infringed
in a number of ways: programming the computer to print out the
contents of the ROM, programming a PROM from a ROM chip, du-
plicating the contents of the ROM with a development machine, or
transferring the contents of the ROM to another ROM through a
computer or a ROM duplicator.24 Moreover, the copyright holder's
exclusive right to prepare derivative works25 is infringed by printing
and then translating the computer language from one form to an-
other, by photographing the ROM and producing an identical chip,
or by making the changes necessary to adopt the program to run on
a different computer.26
ROMs are commonly referred to as firmware: software that is
stored in hardware form. This combination represents a medium of
expression different from that which has previously been encoun-
tered and has caused considerable confusion in the application of
copyright law to computer programs stored in ROMs. Much of this
confusion arises from the terms used and from a lack of understand-
ing of the nature and function of a ROM. 27
III. Recent Revisions of the Copyright Act
Another source of confusion in applying copyright law to com-
puter programs has been the recent revisions of the copyright law. 28
The 1909 Copyright Act 29 was completely revised by the Copyright
record." Note, Copyright: Computer Firmware: Is It Copyrightable?, 36 OKIA. L. REV. 119, 128
(1983).
23 Another kind of memory in computers is a random access memory (RAM). A RAM
is a volatile memory; it will store information only as long as the computer is on. When
the power is turned off, the information stored in the RAM is lost. A RAM is more versa-
tile than a ROM because the computer can erase it and write onto it new instructions or
data. J. FRATEs & W. MO.DRUP, INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPUTER: AN INTEGRATIVE AP-
PROACH 353-54 (1980); R. KRTrrz, supra note 9, at 5; Koenig, supra note 4, at 366-67. Sew
also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.
1983).
24 See Note, supra note 2, at 490-91.
25 The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right "to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). The right to prepare deriv-
ative works includes the right to translate, reproduce, abridge, condense, recast, trans-
form, adapt, revise, annotate, or elaborate upon the copyrighted work or to make any
other modification that, as a whole, represents the original work of authorship. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "derivative work").
26 See Comment, Copyright Protection for Programs Stored in Computer Chips: Competing with
IBM and Apple, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 103, 108 (1984).
27 See Note, supra note 22, at 119.
28 Copyright law has its foundation in the United States Constitution, which states:
"The Congress shall have Power ... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Re-
spective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
29 Copyright Law of 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), amended by Copyright
Act of 1947, ch. 391, § 5, 61 Stat. 652 (1947).
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Act of 1976,30 which was amended in 1980 with provisions applica-
ble to computer programs. 3 1
The drafters of the 1909 Act did not envision the creation of
computers and computer programs. The 1909 Act adopted the
White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo32 test for an infringing copy of a
copyrighted work. The Supreme Court in White-Smith held that a pi-
ano roll was not an infringing copy of the copyrighted sheet music,
because the perforated rolls of paper formed part of the machine,
and the music visually could not be perceived as the original work.33
The Court reasoned that a copy in a medium that does not commu-
nicate in terms of human perception is not an infringement of the
reproduction right. 34 Thus, prior to the 1976 Act, reproduction of a
copyrighted work from a medium that did not communicate directly
to human senses was not a copyright infringement of the original
work.35
In 1964 the Copyright Office began accepting registrations of
computer programs as literary works under its rule of doubt, pro-
vided they contained sufficient original authorship, had been pub-
lished with the required copyright notice, and copies submitted for
registration were in human-readable form.36 The significance of
these registrations in terms of copyright protection, however, was
never definitely decided, because their validity was never challenged
administratively or in the courts.3 7
In 1976 Congress revised the Copyright Act and greatly broad-
ened the scope of copyright protection in many areas. The 1976 Act
did not enumerate computer programs as copyrightable subject mat-
ter, but certain definitional references and legislative history indi-
30 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
31 Computer Software Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (1980).
32 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
33 Id. at 12. The Court's holding conflicted with its later statement that "[any mode
of copying such a thing (sheet music) whether by printing, writing, photography, or by
some other method not yet invented, would no doubt be copying." Id. at 14.
34 See Note, supra note 8, at 403.
35 The House Report indicates, however, that Congress believed that prior to the
1976 Copyright Act, computer programs were protected under the 1909 Copyright Act.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5664 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
36 The Copyright Office focused on two issues with respect to the registrability of
computer programs: "(1) whether a program as such is the 'writing of an author' and thus
copyrightable, and (2) whether a reproduction of the program in a form actually used to
operate or be 'read' by a machine is a 'copy' that can be accepted for copyright registra-
tion." UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER PRO-
GRAMS, reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 361 (1964). Following its policy of resolving
doubtful issues in favor of registration, the Copyright Office accepted registration of com-
puter programs as "books." Id. See alio Cary, Copyright Registration and Computer Programs,
11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 362 (1964).
37 See M. NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 2.04 [C], at 2-44.1 (1983). But see Har-
court, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(Copyright Office practice approved in dictum in nonprogram case).
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cated that Congress intended to protect such works. s8 Section 102
of the Act modified the subject matter of copyright to include "all
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion, now known or later developed, from which they can be per-
ceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."'3 9 Congress intentionally left
the phrase "original work of authorship" undefined to preserve the
originality requirement developed under the commmon law4° and to
protect new forms of expression created by technological ad-
vances. 41 Section 102, however, identifies music, literary works, and
dramatic works as acceptable works of authorship.42 The definition
of literary works includes works "expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the na-
ture of the material objects. . . in which they are embodied." 43 The
legislative history of the Act indicates that this definition was in-
tended to include computer programs "to the extent that they incor-
porate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas,
38 HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975). See also CONTU FINAL REPORT,
supra note 7, at 16 ("[I]t was clearly the intent of Congress to include computer programs
within the scope of copyrightable subject matter in the Act of 1976."); Boorstyn, Copyrights,
Computers and Confusion, 63J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 276, 276 (1981).
39 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). "Originality" in the copyright sense is different from
"new" in the patent sense. "Original" means only that the work is original with the author
and not substantially copied from a single or limited number of sources. Alfred Bell & Co.
v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v.
Graphic Controls Corp., 359 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The legislative history states
that Congress intended that originality "not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or
esthetic merit," nor that the Act "enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require
them." HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws, at 5659.
Works of authorship include: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any ac-
companying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) mo-
tion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982). The House Report states that these categories are "illustrative and not limitative,"
and "do not necessarily exhaust the scope of the original works of authorship that the bill
is intended to protect." Rather, the list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject
matter, but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or outmoded concepts of
the scope of particular categories. HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 53, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5666.
40 The House Report makes clear that the 1976 Act "is intended to incorporate with-
out change the standard of originality established by the courts under the present [1909]
copyright statute." HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, at 5664.
41 The House did not want to "freeze the scope of copyrightable subject matter at the
present stage of communications technology .. " HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 53,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5666. See also M. NIMMER, supra note
37, at § 2.03 [A], at 2-25 (Congress intended flexible definition for copyrightable works).
42 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(l)-(3) (1982).
43 Id. § 101 (definition of "literary work"). Source code and object code easily fall
within the phrase "words, numbers or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia."
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as distinguished from the ideas themselves. 44
For infringement purposes, the 1976 Copyright Act limits copy-
right protection to works that have been "fixed in a tangible medium
of expression when its embodiment in a copy. . . is sufficiently per-
manent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.' 45
In a somewhat circular fashion, the 1976 Act further defines a copy
as "a material object in which a work is fixed by any method now
known or later developed, and from which can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device." 46 The term "copy," as so defined, implicitly
abrogates the White-Smith requirement of human perception 47 and
eliminates from copyright consideration the form in which the origi-
nal work is embodied.48 Thus, before a work can be protected by
copyright, it must be "fixed" in a "copy" so that it is susceptible to
being communicated or reproduced.49
The 1976 Act also sets out the limitations of copyright. A funda-
mental principle of copyright law is that copyright protects only the
expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves. 50 This principle,
known as the idea/expression dichotomy, 5' is codified in section
102(b), which states that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, pro-
cess, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated
or embodied in such a work." 52 Therefore, with respect to computer
,44 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5667.
45 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "fixed in a tangible medium of expression").
46 I (definition of "copy").
47 Addressing the "with the aid of a machine or device" language, the House Report
expressed the intention that this language be read broadly, so as to "avoid the artificial
and largely unjustified distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co. . . . under which statutory copyrightability in certain cases has been made
to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is fixed." HousE REPORT, supra
note 35, at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5665. See also Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[I]t is
clear from the language of the 1976 Act and its legislative history that it was intended to
obliterate distinctions engendered by White-Smith.").
48 HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5665.
49 Comment, supra note 26, at 105. "The term 'copies' includes the material object
. . . in which the work is first fixed." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "copy").
50 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright on book explaining bookkeep-
ing system did not protect the system but only the literary matter expressing the system).
51 See Comment, supra note 26, at 105.
52 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). "Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to
make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in
a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program
are not within the scope of the copyright law." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 56-57,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670. "Section 102(b) in no way
enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose
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programs, the "expression adopted by the programmer is the copy-
rightable element in a computer program, and the actual process or
method in the programs are not within the scope of copyright
law." 53 Thus, computer programs are copyrightable only to the ex-
tent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's original
expression of ideas.
A closely related doctrine is the idea/expression identity. It pro-
vides that "copyrighted language may be copied without infringing
when there is but a limited number of ways to express a given
idea." 54 Thus, where the idea and the expression are merged or in-
separable, there can be no copyright infringement. 55
A second limitation on copyright protection is the principle that
protection extends only to the author's expression, not to the
mechanical or utilitarian portions of an article. 56 Section 101 sets
out this distinction between the copyrightable expression and the
uncopyrightable utilitarian aspects of a work. 57 Copyright law makes
useful articles works of authorship only "insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned" and only to the
extent that their design incorporates features that can be identified
separately from and exist independently of the articles' utilitarian as-
pects. 58 Consequently, only those components of a ROM embody-
ing a work of authorship apart from the medium's utilitarian aspects
are entitled to copyright protection.
Although the 1976 Act extended copyright protection to com-
puter programs, the scope of that protection was left undefined. In
debating amendment of the Act, Congress recognized that the pro-
is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic
dichotomy between expression and ideas remains unchanged." Id.
53 HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5670. See also S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1975).
54 The Commission explained that the idea/expression identity exception is the "log-
ical extension of the fundamental principle that copyright cannot protect ideas." CONTU
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 50. The idea/expression identity has been described as a
test for infringeability whereas the idea/expression dichotomy is a test for copyrightability.
See Comment, supra note 26, at 105 n.16.
55 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)
(jeweled bee pin expression inseparable from the idea); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (sweepstakes contest rules were not copyrightable be-
cause idea and expression were inseparable). "When the idea and its 'expression' are thus
inseparable copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression'
in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner
free of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law." See, e.g., Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (copyright protects only against copy-
ing and not against independent creation of the same work).
56 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (Court upheld the copyright for a sculptural
work that had been incorporated in a useful article).
57 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilita-
rian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or convey
information.").
58 HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5659, 5667-68.
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posed revisions failed to address the problems unique to the infor-
mation processing field. Fearing premature change and inadequate
treatment of the copyright problem as it related to computer uses of
copyrighted works, Congress decided to maintain the status quo un-
til further study could be completed. 59
Previously, Congress had entrusted the responsibility for fram-
ing legislative recommendations in this area to the National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU),
which had the broad mandate to gather information and make spe-
cific recommendations on legislation concerning the reproduction
and uses of copyrighted works of authorship in computer systems.60
Consequently, the 1976 Act contained a specific provision that pre-
served the previous law as it related to scope of protection accorded
copyrighted works used in conjunction with computers, pending
completion of CONTU's study.6' This section created a problem in-
itially in applying the language of the revised statute to object code.
Because White-Smith and the 1909 Act required that a "copy" be in a
59 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5731.
Since it would be premature to change existing law on computer uses at pres-
ent, the purpose of Section 117 is to preserve the status quo. It is intended
neither to cut off any rights that may now exist, nor create new rights that
might be denied under the Act of 1909 or under common law principles cur-
rently applicable.
Id.
60 Act of December 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873, as amended by Act of
October 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-146, 91 Stat. 1226. This law mandated CONTU to
study, compile data, and prepare recommendations on the following:
(1) the reproduction and uses of copyrighted works of authorship-
(a) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving, and transferring information; and
(b) by various forms of machine reproduction by or at the request of
instructors for use in face to face teaching activities; and
(2) the creation of new words by the application or intervention of such au-
tomatic systems of machine reproduction ....
Id. See also Note, supra note 8, at 403.
61 Section 117 states:
Scope of Exclusive Rights: Use in Conjunction with Computers and Similar
Information Systems
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 106 through 116 and 118, this
title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser
rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic sys-
tems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring information,
or in conjunction with any similar device, machine or process, than those
afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or stat-
utes of a state, in effect on December 31, 1977 as held applicable and con-
strued by a court in an action brought under this title.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. 1 1977), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). See Ringer, The Unfin-
ished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 UCLA L. REv. 951, 964-65 (1977).
Section 117 applied, however, only to the scope of protection to be accorded copy-
righted works used in conjunction with a computer and not to the copyrightability of com-
puter programs. The House Report notes that "[w]ith respect to the copyrightability of
computer programs, the ownership of copyrights in them, the term of protection, and the
formal requirements of the remainder of the bill, the new statute would apply." HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 35, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5731.
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form intelligible to humans, some people interpreted section 117 to
mean that machine-readable object code was not considered to be a
"copy" within the meaning of the statute.62
CONTU submitted its final report to Congress in July 1978, and
Congress adopted its recommendations in the 1980 Computer
Software Act. 6 3 The Software Act repealed the troublesome status
quo provision, section 117 of the 1976 Act, and substituted a new
section 117 specifying certain limitations on the rights of computer
program owners.64 The Software Act permits the owner of a com-
puter program to make another copy or adaptation to facilitate its
use or guard against damage or destruction. 65 Listing only two ex-
ceptions, Congress implicitly made any other copying or adaptation
of a program an infringement of the copyright owner's exclusive
right to reproduction.66 The Software Act also added a new defini-
tion to section 101: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order
to bring about a certain result." 67
The explicit purpose of the 1980 amendment was to extend
62 See Comment, The Current State of Computer Software Protection: A Survey and Bibliogra-
phy of Copyright, Trade Secret and Patent Alternatives, 8 NOVA L.J. 107, 113 (1983-84).
63 Act of December 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). The Commis-
sion recommended:
The new copyright law should be amended: (1) to make it explicit that com-
puter programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation,
are proper subject matter of copyright; (2) to apply to all computer uses of
copyrighted programs by the deletion of the present § 117; and (3) to ensure
that rightful possessors of copies of computer programs may use or adapt
these copies for their use.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
64 Section 117 Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer Programs
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that
all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of
the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance within the provisions of this section
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as a part of the lease, sale or other
transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be trans-
ferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
65 Id.
66 See Rodau, Protecting Computer Software: After Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), Does Copyright Provide the Best Protection, 57 TEM-
PLE L.Q 527, 546 (1984); Stem, supra note 4 at 8; Note, Copyright Object Code: Applying Old
Legal Tools to New Technologies, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 421,428-29 (1983-84). See also M. NIMMER,
supra note 37, § 2.04 [C], at 2-44 and § 8.08, at 8-103. Section 106 of the Copyright Act
sets out the rights granted to holders of a copyright, while sections 107-118 express the
limits on those rights.
67 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "computer program").
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copyright protection to computer programs. 68 Two factors, however,
have restricted the scope of the amendment. First, the Commission
in its final report, vacillated on the issue of duplication of object code
stored in ROMs, ultimately leaving the issue to the courts.69 Second,
and more important, is the strong dissent of Commissioner Hersey
from the final recommendations. 70 Hersey drew a distinction be-
tween the written and mechanical forms of computer programs, stat-
ing that copyright protection should not extend to a computer
program in the form in which it is capable of being used to control
computer operations.7' He contended that a computer program in
its object form "is a machine control element, a mechanical device,
having no purpose beyond being engaged in a computer program to
perform mechanical work."' 72 This argument is based on the distinc-
tion between a work intended for human perception and a utilitarian
object. Thus, Hersey viewed a computer program not as a writing
that sets forth instructions, but as the mechanical embodiment of the
instructions themselves.
Hersey further noted that the expression in the original writing
that communicates to human perception is lost once a program is
placed in a computer in object form; "work is its only utterance and
its only purpose."73 Hersey also emphasized that even if a computer
program is a writing, it is not copyrightable because it is addressed to
and communicates with machines instead of human beings. "The
computer program communicates, if at all, with only a machine." 74
68 The Software Act "embodies the recommendations of the Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works with respect to clarifying the law of copyright
computer software..." and "has the effect of clearly applying the [1976 Act] to computer
programs. . . " H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I at 23 and Part II at 19
(1980). Accord Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1982)
(copyrightability of computer programs is firmly established by the 1980 amendments to
the Copyright Act).
69 The CONTU majority observed that "[c]opyright, therefore protects the program
so long as it remains fixed in a tangible medium of expression but does not protect the
electro-mechanical functioning of a machine." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 21.
In its summary, CONTU pointed out that it had not resolved the issues raised by programs
imprinted on ROMs. "It is equally important to note that these recommendations do not
deal with each and every technological issue affecting the interests of copyright users and
owners. Specific topics may deserve congressional attention. . . (2) protection for topog-
raphy or layout of microcircuit chips. Id. at 79. See Note, Microcomputer Emulation: Protect-
ing Manufacturersfrom Computer Copying, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 656, 672 (1983).
70 CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 69-93 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Com-
missioner Nimmer, concurring in the majority opinion, suggested that protection should
be extended to only those computer programs "which produce works which themselves
qualify for copyright protection . . ." not to those programs whose "operations do not
result in copyrightable works." CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 68. The majority,
however, rejected that view: "This distinction is not consistent with the design of the 1976
Act, which was clearly to protect all works of authorship. ... Id. at 53.
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id. at 70.
73 Id. at 72.
74 Id.
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Hersey maintains that extending copyright protection to computer
programs in object form "would mark the first time copyright had
ever covered a means of communication, not with the human mind
and senses, but with machines."' 75 Thus, although Congress
adopted the CONTU majority position extending copyright protec-
tion to computer programs, the issues of human intelligibility and
utilitarian function have influenced the interpretation and restricted
the application of the 1976 Act and the 1980 amendments in copy-
right infringement cases involving computer programs stored in
ROM.
IV. Recent Developments in Copyright Case Law
The first case arising under the Copyright Act of 1976, Data Cash
Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc. ,76 involved the direct copying of a
ROM. Plaintiff Data Cash manufactures and sells "Compu-Chess," a
hand-held computerized chess game.7 7 The computer's program,
which instructs the computer how to play chess at six different levels
of difficulty, is stored in a ROM chip and installed in the computer's
circuitry. 78 In late 1978, plaintiff began marketing "Compu-Chess"
without the copyright notice on the game or its packaging. The
copyright notice, however, did appear on the source program which
had been registered with the copyright office. The alleged infringe-
ment occurred in late 1978 when defendant JS&A began marketing
the "Chess Computer," a less expensive game containing a ROM
identical to the one in plaintiff's game.79
The district court held that copyright protected programs in
their flowchart, source, and assembly forms and assumed that de-
fendant directly had copied plaintiff's ROM to produce its game.80
The court, however, refused to order a preliminary injunction re-
straining the sale of the "Chess Computer." Interpreting section 117
of the 1976 Act as a broad moratorium to preserve the status quo of
copyright protection for computer programs as it existed prior to the
effective date of the revision, the court decided that the 1909 Act,
and not the 1976 Act, applied. 8' Relying on the reasoning employed
in White-Smith and embodied in the 1909 Act, the court denied copy-
right protection to plaintiff's ROM, holding that because it was in a
form imperceptible to the human eye, the computer program in its
75 Id. at 69-70.
76 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affid on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
77 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
78 Idt at 1066.
79 Id.
80 Id at 1068. Judge Flaum concluded that a computer program in its flowchart or
source phase is a copy of a computer program because they are comparable technical writ-
ings. Id.
81 Id. at 1066-67.
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object form was "a mechanical tool or machine part," not a "copy"
within the meaning of the 1909 Act.8 2
In controversial dictum, the district court stated that copying a
ROM would not be an infringement under the 1976 Act. The court
noted that object code in ROM is essentially a "mechanical device,"
not a work of authorship, and therefore, not entitled to copyright
protection.83
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court decision on alter-
native grounds.8 4 The court agreed that the 1909 Act, and not the
1976 Act, applied, but upheld the decision on the grounds that plain-
tiff had forfeited any infringement claim it had by failing to place the
required copyright notice anywhere on the machine or chip.8 5
Although the court avoided the "copy" issue by deciding the case on
other grounds, implicitly it ruled on the issue, because when a work
is published, there is an underlying supposition that what was pub-
lished was a "copy" of the work.86
In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufmans7 the court ruled that the out-
put of the computer program in a video game, the audiovisual dis-
play, satisfied the statutory requirements of fixation and originality,
and therefore, qualified for copyright protection. Plaintiff Stern had
exclusive license to distribute the video game, Scramble, in North
and South America. Plaintiff failed to register the computer program
used to implement the game, but had filed a videotape of the game's
audiovisual display with the copyright office.88 Plaintiff alleged that
defendant had infringed his copyright by marketing a game with an
identical audiovisual display.8 9
The district court issued a preliminary injunction after ruling
that under sections 101 and 102 of the 1976 Act, the audiovisual
display of a video game is copyrightable as an audiovisual work.90
The court also held that copying the audiovisual display of a video
game constitutes an infringement regardless of whether the game's
underlying computer program has been copied in any form.91
On appeal, defendant claimed that plaintiff's game was not
copyrightable, because the audiovisual display neither was an "origi-
82 Id. at 1069. The court determined that "since the ROM is not in a form which one
can 'see and read' with the naked eye, it is not a 'copy' within the meaning of the 1909
Act." Id.
83 Id. at 1066-67 n.4. See Keplinger, supra note 19, at 464 (computer program in its
object phase is a mechanical device and is engaged in the computer to become an essential
part of the mechanical process).
84 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
85 Id. at 1041-42.
86 See M. NIMMER, supra note 37, § 8.08, at 8-108.1.
87 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afid, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
88 Id. at 637.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 638-39. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(6) (1982).
91 Id. at 639.
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nal work of authorship" nor "fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression" within the meaning of the statute. 92 Defendant based
these arguments on the fact that the visual images in play mode va-
ried with each player's participation. 95 The court held that although
the sequence of some of the images appearing on the screen during
the play of the game varied depending upon the actions taken by the
player, "many aspects of the sights and sequence of appearance re-
mained constant during each play, . . .and that the repetitive se-
quence of a substantial portion of the sights and sounds of the game
qualifies for copyright protection as an audiovisual work." 94
Second, the court found that the game's memory devices satis-
fied the statutory requirement of a "copy" in which the work is
"fixed," because the audiovisual work is embodied permanently in a
material object, the ROM, from which it can be perceived with the
aid of the other components of the game.95 Thus, Stern provides that
actions for copyright infringement can be brought for duplication of
the computer program or its output.
The first case to consider whether a computer program stored in
a ROM inside a computer could be copyrighted and infringed was
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. 96 Plaintiff Tandy sued de-
fendant, a competitor in the personal computer market, for copy-
right infringement and other acts of unfair competition. Tandy
alleged that defendant had duplicated the input-output program
contained in its home computer, the TRS-80, for use in their own
computer, the PMC-80. 97 The program that translated the program-
mer's source code into machine-readable object code was stored per-
manently on a ROM chip in the computer. Tandy registered the
source program with the Copyright Office and claimed that defend-
ant copied the program and then imprinted the copy on another
ROM after changing any indicia of Tandy ownership.98
Defendant moved to dismiss Tandy's copyright infringement
claim, contending that "ROM chips are not copies of the original
computer program within the meaning of the federal copyright laws
and that therefore a ROM chip which is a copy of another ROM chip
does not infringe the copyright covering the original program." 99
In considering defendant's contention, the court's analysis cen-
tered on sections 101 and 102 of the 1976 Act.' 00 First, the court
92 669 F.2d at 855.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 856.
95 Id. at 855 & n.4.
96 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
97 Id. at 173.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982).
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inquired as to whether a computer program is a "work of author-
ship" subject to copyright protection. Second, it questioned whether
a silicon chip is a "tangible medium of expression" so as "to make a
program fixed in that form subject to copyright laws." °
After reviewing the legislative history of the Copyright Act, 10 2
the Tandy court expressly repudiated the Data Cash dicta interpreting
section 117 to require application of pre-1978 law. 10 3 Without dis-
tinguishing among the various program languages, the court held
that all computer programs were "works of authorship" and "subject
to copyright protection under the law as it existed prior to the 1976
Act, as well as under the new statute."' 0 4 Turning to the fixation
requirement, the court emphasized that "fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression" includes material objects that can be "per-
ceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 105 The court also noted that
the legislative intent was to ignore the form in which the work was
fixed. 10 6 Consequently, the court concluded that because a com-
puter can execute a program imprinted on a silicon chip, a computer
program stored in ROM meets the statutory requirement of fixation
and is therefore a "copy" of the original program, and any duplica-
tion of the chip is an infringement.10 7
The court also noted that, as a matter of public policy, interpret-
ing the copyright to permit a competitor lawfully to copy the object
code from a silicon chip would render copyright protection for com-
10 1 Id.
102 Id. See, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 35, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 5659, 5664.
103 524 F. Supp. at 174. "Section 177 modified only sections 106 through 116 and
118, which are the sections concerned with the scope of copyright protection." Id.
"[S]ection 117 makes clear on its face that its direction to apply pre-1978 law is not to
apply to sections 101 and 102 of the act, which . . . clearly allows a program in this form
[ROM] to be copyrighted and protected." Id See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 116,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5731. Finally, the court concluded
that section 117 was only addressed "to the problems surrounding the input of properly
obtained copyrighted materials." Id.
104 Id. at 173.
105 Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)).
106 Id. The court cited the legislative history which indicated the expansive nature of
the definition of "fixed":
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of
fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or
any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object
in written, printed, magnetic, or other stable form, and whether it is capable
of perception directly by means of any machine or device "now known or
later developed."
Id. (quoting HouSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5659, 5665).
107 Id. See also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(court found ROM in plaintiff's video game protected by copyright), afd, 704 F.2d 1009
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983).
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puter programs "virtually meaningless."'' 0 8 The court further stated
that the revised Act was not intended to provide a "loophole"
through which a competitor could duplicate with impunity a com-
puter program stored in "read-only memory."' 0 9
The Tandy reasoning subsequently was adopted in GCA Corp. v.
Chance, "10 which held that object code was a copy of source code and
protected under the source code copyright. GCA, a manufacturer of
machines used to process silicon wafers for the creation of integrated
circuits, sought to enjoin defendants from reproducing its computer
programs in object form.I' Though registered in source code with
the Copyright Office, the programs were employed in plaintiff's
machine in object form. 112 Defendants, several former employees
who had access to the program, admitted copying it in object code,
but contended that the object form in ROM was not a copy under the
copyright laws and that copyrighting the source code did not protect
the object code." 13
The GC, court issued a preliminary injunction after determining
that "source code falls within the protection of copyright laws as a
work of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression from
which it can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated."" 14 The court reasoned that "[b]ecause the object code is the
encryption of the copyrightable source code, the two are to be
treated as one work; therefore, copyright of the source code protects
the object code as well."' 15 The court was not persuaded by defend-
ants' reliance on the Data Cash dicta, noting that the Seventh Circuit
disregarded the district court's contention that a ROM is not a copy
under the copyright laws." t 6
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams Electronics, Inc. v.
Artic International Inc. 17 was the first appellate court to consider the
issue whether duplication of the object form of a computer program
infringes the copyright in the written program. Plaintiff Williams
manufactures and sells video games that are controlled by a com-
puter program in object form, a ROM." 8 In 1980 Williams intro-
duced the popular video game, Defender, and obtained copyright
registrations on its computer program, audiovisual attract mode, and
108 Id. at 175. See M. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.08, at 8-106.3 to 8-106.4
(1983).
109 Id.
110 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
111 Id. at 719.
112 Id
113 Id
114 1d at 720. Accord Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp.
171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
115 217 U.S.P.Q. at 720.
116 1d
117 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
118 Id. at 871-72.
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audiovisual display mode."19 Copyright notices were displayed
prominently on the game's cabinet and on the screen during the at-
tract and play modes. Other notices were affixed to the ROM's outer
casing and within the computer program stored in the ROM.1 20 De-
fendant Artic manufactures electronic video game components, one
of which, when connected with the game's other components, pro-
duces a visual display identical to plaintiff's Defender game. 121
The district court held that defendant had "copied substantial
portions of the plaintiffs computer program for the game Defender
and that such copying constitutes an infringement of plaintiff's com-
puter program."1 22 The court issued a permanent injunction prohib-
iting further sale of the infringing components. 23
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected defendant's arguments
against copyrightability and reached the same conclusion as Tandy' 24
and GCA, 125 ruling that a computer program stored in a ROM is a
copy of a copyrighted work. 126 First, defendant claimed that there
could not be copyright protection for the game's video display, be-
cause the images in both the attract mode and the play mode are
transient, and theref6re, the work fails to meet the 1976 Act's fixa-
tion requirement.127 Citing provisions of the 1976 Act regarding au-
diovisual works 128  and prior holdings establishing the
copyrightability of both the attract and play modes of video
games, 129 the court rejected defendant's argument, stating that the
fixation requirement is satisfied whenever a work is "sufficiently per-
manent or stable to permit it to be . . .reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for more than a transitory period."' 130 The court rea-
soned that because the videogame's original audiovisual features re-
peated themselves over and over, the video game's original display
satisfied the statutory definition of an original audiovisual work, and
119 Id. at 872. "The 'attract mode' refers to the audiovisual effects displayed before a
coin is inserted into the game. It repeatedly shows the name of the game, the game sym-
bols in typical motion and interaction patterns, and the initials of previous players who
have achieved high scores." Id. at 872 n.2. "The 'play mode' refers to the audiovisual
effects displayed during the actual play of the game, when the game symbols move and
interact on the screen, and the player controls the movement of one of the symbols ....
Id. at 872 n.3.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 872-73.
122 Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., No. 81-1852 (D.N.J. June 24, 1981).
123 Williams, 685 F.2d at 871.
124 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
125 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
126 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
127 Id. at 873.
128 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1982).
129 Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. I11. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc.,
547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D.
Neb. 1981).
130 Williams, 685 F.2d at 874.
684 [VOL. 10
1985] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS 685
that the memory device, a ROM, met the statutory requirement of a
copy in which the work is fixed.13'
The court also rejected the defendant's contention that the
player's participation in the play mode eliminates copyright eligibil-
ity because there is no set or fixed performance and the player be-
comes a co-author of what appears on the screen.' 3 2 The court
stated that, although the audiovisual presentation of the play mode
changes in some respects in response to the player's varying partici-
pation, "there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion
of the sights and sounds of the game, and many of the aspects of the
display remain constant regardless of how the player operates the
controls." 133
Defendant further contended that a ROM is a utilitarian device
or a machine part used to control the activities of a machine, and
therefore, not within the scope of the 1976 Copyright Act.' 3 4 The
court rejected defendant's reasoning by drawing a critical distinction
between a ROM and its contents: Williams was not trying to protect
the ROM itself, but was instead seeking to protect only its copy-
righted program embodied in the ROM. Because William's program
was the expression of an original work of authorship that had met
the statutory fixation requirement through their embodiment in
ROM, the court concluded that the program was subject to copyright
protection. '3 5
Finally, defendant claimed that a distinction should be drawn
between the "source code" version of a computer program, which
can be afforded copyright protection, and the object form, which
cannot be protected, because a "copy" for infringement purposes
must be fixed in a material object that is intended as a medium of
communication to human beings.' 36 Rejecting defendant's argu-
ment, the court held that the 1976 Act sought to prevent infringe-
ment of a computer program by copying the object form, and cited
the statute's broad definition of "copy" as a material object in which
a work is fixed "by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or de-
vice.' t 3 7 The court noted that the legislative history of the 1976 Act
131 Id.
132 Id.
13 Ld.
134 Id.
'35 Id. at 874-75. Although the court believed that the legislative history and the
CONTU Report suggested that computer programs had already been covered under the
1976 Copyright Act, it did not consider the scope of prior acts for purposes of affirming
the injunction order. Instead, the court held that the 1980 amendments firmly established
the copyrightability of computer programs. Id. at 875.
136 id. at 876-77.
'37 Id at 877 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
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expanded the scope of the "fixation" and "copy" requirements to
encompass technological advances represented by electronic devices
such as ROMs, and was intended to eliminate the artificial and
largely unjustified distinction created by cases such as White-Smith. 38
Thus, the court concluded that the statutory requirements of
"fixation" and "copy" were satisfied, and therefore, that computer
programs in object form stored in ROM were copies protected by
the 1976 Act.' 3 9 The court further reasoned that, as a matter of pub-
lic policy, to hold otherwise "would afford an unlimited loophole by
which infringement of a computer program is limited to copying of
the computer program text, but not to duplication of a computer
program fixed on a silicon chip."' 40
Copyright protection for computer programs stored in ROMs
was further ensured in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon.14 1 Plain-
tiff Midway, manufacturer of the immensely popular PAC-MAN
video game,' 42 alleged that defendant Strohon had infringed its
copyrighted object code computer program by marketing a modifica-
tion kit designed to "speed up" the PAC-MAN game. 143 Defendant
argued that a computer program in object code stored in a silicon
chip is a form of computer circuitry or hardware, and therefore, is an
unprotectible utilitarian object.' 44
The court held that although defendant's modification kit did
not infringe the game's copyrighted audiovisual component, it did
infringe plaintiff's "literary works" copyright, because it was substan-
tially similar to the computer program stored in ROM in plaintiff's
game.' 45 According to the court, the current copyright legislation is
intended to protect object code as well as source code, and machine-
readable object code is a work of authorship that can be perceived
with the aid of a machine or device, and therefore, is protectible by
copyright. 146 Also, copyright protection would be meaningless if ob-
ject code, which is a direct transformation of a computer program in
source code, could be freely reproduced without constituting an
138 I at 877 & n.8. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5659, 5665.
139 Williams, 685 F.2d at 877.
140 Id
141 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. I1. 1983).
142 For a detailed description of PAC-MAN, see Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Con-
sumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1982).
143 564 F. Supp. at 744. The purpose of a modification fit is to complicate and speed
up the action of the game to make it more difficult for practiced players. By decreasing the
time of each play and increasing the number of plays, "speed-up" kits make modified
video games more profitable. Id.
144 Id. at 751.
145 Id. at 746-49.
146 Id at 750. Focusing on § 10 I's definition of a computer program as a set of in-
structions to be used directly in a computer to achieve a certain result, the court found it
apparent that a computer program in object code is used directly by a computer in carry-
ing out its operations. Id
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infringement. 14 7
The Midway court used similar reasoning to find object code in
ROMs to be copies under the statute. Comparing ROMs with mag-
netic tape and floppy disks, the court reasoned that because the func-
tion of each material object is to store information that directs the
operation of a computer, it would be anomalous to provide copy-
right protection on the basis of the program's storage medium. 148
Two recent cases, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International'49
and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,' 50 both involving
Apple software, have considered not only the copyrightability of
computer programs in ROM, but also the more problematic issue
whether certain kinds of computer programs-operating system pro-
grams as distinguished from application programs-are proper sub-
ject matter for copyright protection.' 5 '
In Formula Apple brought suit for copyright and trademark in-
fringement after defendant Formula International began selling a
computer kit under the trademark, "Pineapple." The Pineapple
computer kit contained operating programs embodied in ROMs and
diskettes that were identical to the programs used to control plain-
tiff's computer, the Apple 11.152 Apple charged that Formula vio-
lated its copyright on the various computer programs embodied in
the Apple ROMs and diskettes.' 53 In defense, Formula contended
that operations programs that are essential to the operation of the
computer and do not create visually perceptible images or expres-
sions, as distinguished from application programs, are not
147 let "To allow protection of the source code version of a program would be pyrrhic
indeed if the object code version, the mechanical implementation of the same program,
stored and marketed on discs or tapes, for example, could be freely reproduced without
constituting an infringement." Id
148 Id. at 751-52.
149 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
150 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
151 Operating system programs generally manage the internal functions of the com-
puter or facilitate use of application programs. These programs allow the computer and
its components to work together by controlling the operations between the peripheral
equipment, such as the video monitor, disk drives, and printer, and the computer. Operat-
ing system programs also provide compatibility between the computer and other software
manufactured in the general market place by translating those programs from higher-level
langauges to machine-language object code. In contrast, application programs usually
perform a specific task for the computer user, such as word processing, checkbook balanc-
ing, record maintenance, payroll calculation, or playing a video game. Application pro-
grams can be used by a computer only in conjunction with an operating system program.
SeeJ. FRATES & W. MOLDRUP, supra note 23, at 240-42; G. SHELLY & T. CASHMAN, supra note
14, at 2.19; Comment, supra note 26, at 112 nn.59-60. See generally Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (3d Cir. 1983); Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 813-15 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd and remanded,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
152 562 F. Supp. at 777.
153 Id
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copyrightable.' 54
Drawing on the language of the Copyright Act, its legislative his-
tory, and public policy, the court held that all computer programs,
fixed in any medium, are protected under copyright law regardless of
their purpose or function.' 5 5 Reviewing the Copyright Act, the court
found that computer programs stored in ROM fit within the Act's
definition, and therefore, are protected. 156 Citing prior judicial in-
terpretations, 57 the court specifically noted that a computer pro-
gram stored in ROM is a "work of authorship" and "a tangible
medium of expression" and that the expression of a program in
source code or object code is protected as a "copy.' 5 8 Thus, a com-
puter program stored in ROM is included within the terms of the
Act.
Defendant Formula also contended that computer programs
that are essential to the operation of the computer and that do not
create visually perceptible images or expressions are not copyright-
able. 159 The Formula court rejected defendant's argument, reason-
ing that although operating systems do not produce a direct visual
expression, they communicate information. The court stated that
"all computer programs as embodied in ROMs and diskettes are
designed to operate a machine in such a way as to ultimately produce
some useful communication to the user," whether the program di-
rectly communicates with the user or "merely direct[s] certain
machine functions which eventually result in that expression."'160
The court thus concluded that there was no statutory authority sug-
gesting different treatment for functionally different computer
programs.' 6 '
Turning to the Act's legislative history, the court declared that
"[i]t is crystal-clear that CONTU recommended that all computer
programs, fixed in any method and performing any function, be in-
cluded within copyright protection. There likewise can be no doubt
but that Congress accepted that recommendation as embodied in the
1980 Amendment to the copyright law."' 162
The court also rejected defendant's public policy argument that
154 Id. at 779-80.
155 Id. at 778-82.
156 Id. at 779.
157 Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Williams Elecs., Inc. v.
Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q 718
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
450 (D. Idaho 1983).
158 562 F. Supp. at 779-80.
159 Id. at 780.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 ld at 781. In rejecting defendant's distinction between operation and application
programs, the Formula court relied on the conclusions of the CONTU majority:
688 [VOL. 10
1985] COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS 689
issuing a preliminary injunction would preserve Apple's market posi-
tion and hinder competition.1 63 The court stated that the phenome-
nal growth of the computer equipment and software industry
contradicted defendant's suggestion that Apple was capable of
"dominating such an expanding market."' 64 Furthermore, it would
be to Apple's advantage to have a greater variety of compatible pro-
gramming software available for the owners of its computers.' 65
The court stated "that numerous methods exist for writing the pro-
grams involved here that would be '98% compatible' with.Apple's
computers, yet not so similar as to infringe its copyright."' 66 Con-
cluding that defendant was free independently to create programs to
perform the same function as Apple software, the court warned,
however, that defendant may not do so by directly copying plaintiff's
programs. To do so, the court reasoned, would permit defendant to
misappropriate plaintiffs substantial research and development
costs, and thus, hinder rather than promote competition and innova-
tion in the computer software market. 167 Therefore, Apple was enti-
tled to an injunction on copyright grounds.
In the Franklin case' 68 Apple sought injunctive relief against de-
fendant Franklin, which allegedly had copied fourteen Apple pro-
grams and incorporated them into its own personal computer, the
ACE 100.169 The Apple programs in issue were expressed in object
code, some stored in floppy disks, and others embodied in ROMs
This distinction is not consistent with the design of the Act of 1976,
which was clearly to protect all works of authorship from the moment of their
fixation in any tangible medium of expression. Further, it does not square
with copyright practice past and present, which recognizes copyright protec-
tion for a work of authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be put.
The copyright status of the written rules for a game of system for the opera-
tion of a machine is unaffected by the fact that those rules direct the actions
of those who play the game or carry out the process. Nor has copyright been
denied to works simply because of their utilitarian aspects. It follows, there-
fore, that there should be likewise no distinction made between programs
which are used in the production of further copyrighted works and those
which are not.
Id. at 781-82 (quoting CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 21).
163 Id. at 782-83.
164 Id. at 782.
165 Id
166 Id. Judge Hill continued that "[i]f there were only one or two ways to write a
program for a particular function, then extending copyright protection to the program
might in effect give its author a patent on the idea itself. But those facts do not exist in this
case." Id.
167 Id. at 783. Although the court found for the plaintiff, it expressed reservations as
to the adequacy of copyright protection for computer programs. The court suggested that
a hybrid or entirely new form of protection be created, but that the legislature, not the
court, would be the proper forum for that determination. The court concluded, however,
that "to the extent [the court] is free to express public policy, its choice is to place com-
puter programs into an existing category of legal protection as against affording them no
protection at all." Id.
168 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
169 Id. at 812-13.
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within Apple's computer.'70
The district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction, ex-
pressing "doubt as to the copyrightability of the programs described
in this litigation."' 7'1 Despite an extensive analysis of the 1976 Act,
its legislative history, and prior cases, the court was unable to deter-
mine whether programs in object form were protected under copy-
right law.' 72 The court found that the statute and accompanying
legislative history were unclear as to the applicability of copyright
law to ROMs and object code.' 7 3 The court narrowed the issue to
whether computer programs are the fixed expression of an author's
original work. The court concluded that "[i]t is not clear whether
the program-designer's idea of the operating system, the source pro-
gram or the ROM is the original work of authorship."' 74
The court then focused on the issues of utilitarian function and
human perception. Viewing a ROM as a pictoral three-dimensional
object rather than a literary work, the court held that "ROMs en-
coded within an object program may be compared to a physical
structure with an essential useful purpose or function. . . . As such,
an object program encoded on a ROM would not be entitled to
copyright protection."' 175 Finally, as to whether object code is an ex-
pression, the court stated that copyright law only protects expres-
sions directed to a human audience and not to "programs created by
a computer to run other computers."' 76
Expanding on its decision in Williams, the Third Circuit re-
versed, holding that a computer program in object code embedded
in a ROM chip is subject to copyright protection. 177 Unable to de-
termine the basis for the district court decision,' 78 the court identi-
fied three issues for review: (1) whether copyright can exist in a
170 Id. at 815-16.
171 Id at 812.
172 Id. at 820-25.
173 Id
174 Id. at 820.
175 Id. at 823.
176 Id. at 825. The court stated tht copyright protection extended only to the fixed
expression of human languages, not machine language:
To go beyond the bounds of this protection would be ultimately to provide
copyright protection to the programs created by a computer to run other
computers. With that, we step in the world of Gulliver where horses are
"human" because they speak a language that sounds remarkably like the one
humans use. It is an intriguing analogy but false.
Id "The issue in copyright, however, is not whether a horse or a human uses a language,
but whether a horse or a human creates and fixes it." Note, The Medium Is the Message:
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corporation, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 351, 366
(1984).
177 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
178 714 F.2d at 1246. The court interpreted the decision of the district court as the
expression of "a series of generalized concerns which may have led the court to its ulti-
mate conclusion," rather than a holding. Id. The court stated that "there is no finding,
statement, or holding on which clearly sets forth the district court's view." Id.
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computer program expressed in object code; (2) whether copyright
can exist in a computer program embedded in a ROM; and (3)
whether copyright can exist in an operating system program. t 79
The court summarily rejected defendant Franklin's initial argu-
ment that a computer program expressed in object code, as distin-
guished form source code, is not subject to copyright protection. 180
After reviewing the broad language of the 1976 Act, the 1980
amendments, the CONTU Report, and Williams, the court held that a
computer program, whether in source code or object code, is an
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression
perceivable directly or with the aid of a machine or device, and there-
fore, is protected under the Copyright Act as a "literary work."''
The court further held that a computer program in object code em-
bedded in a ROM chip also is an appropriate subject of copyright,
because it falls within the statutory requirement of fixation.' 82
The court then addressed an issue of first impresssion: whether
operating system programs, as distinguished from application pro-
grams, are the proper subject of copyright.183 First, relying on Sec-
tion 102 and Baker v. Selden,' 84 Franklin contended that operating
system programs are excluded per se from copyright protection, be-
cause such programs are a "process," "system," or a method of op-
eration that might be patented but cannot be copyrighted.' 8 5
Second, defendant argued that under the idea/expression dichot-
omy, as embodied in section 102(b), operating system programs are
ideas and are not copyrightable.' 8 6 In the most comprehensive
opinion to date, the court dismissed each of defendant's arguments.
First, while the court agreed that copyright law protects only the
expression of a process or method and not the process or method
itself, it found that defendant had misapplied the distinction, because
plaintiff sought only to copyright the program's instruction them-
selves, and not the actual method, which instructs the computer to
perform its operating function.' 87 The court further found defend-
ant's distinction between copyrightable application programs and
noncopyrightable operating system programs inconsistent, because
defendant conceded that application software is copyrightable, and
that both kinds of programs instruct the computer to perform a par-
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1246-47.
181 Id. at 1246-49.
182 Id at 1249. Accord Williams, 685 F.2d at 876; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173.
183 lI at 1249.
184 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (copyright does not protect ideas).
185 714 F.2d at 1250.
186 Id
187 Id at 1250-51. The court stated that "the method would be protected, if at all, by
the patent law, an issue as yet unresolved. ... Id See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981).
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
ticular function.' 8 8 The instructions are protected, not the "pro-
cess." Therefore, the court concluded that both operating system
programs and application programs are protected under copyright
law regardless of their specific function or purpose.'8 9
In a similar "process" argument, defendant contended that an
operating system program stored in a ROM or other storage me-
dium is a machine or machine part, and therefore, not protected by
copyright law. 190 The court stated that defendant mistakenly fo-
cused on the physical characteristics of the instructions. Comparing
ROMs and other storage media, the court emphasized that the "me-
dium is not the message" and held that the copyrightability of a com-
puter program does not depend on the medium in which the
program is stored. 19 1
In its final "process" argument, defendant argued that operat-
ing system programs cannot be copyrighted, because they are
"purely utilitarian works."' 192 Citing Mazer v. Stein 193 and the
CONTU Report, the court stated that the intended use or use in in-
dustry of a program does not bar copyright protection, and that a
program used in the implementation of a process is copyright-
able. 194 The court further supported its rejection of the defendant's
process claims by indicating that the statutory definition of a com-
puter program-a set of instructions to be used in a computer to
bring about a certain result-makes no distinction between applica-
tion programs and operating system programs.' 9 5
Second, Franklin claimed that, based on the idea/expression di-
chotomy, operating system programs are excluded from copyright
protection, because they are ideas that merged with their expres-
sion-they could be written only in one way. 19 6 Noting the difficulty
in articulating the difference between an idea and an expression, the
Franklin court attempted to strike a balance between the competing
considerations of free competition and copyright protection.19 7 The
188 Id. at 1251.
189 Id. The court concluded there is "no reason to afford any less copyright protection
to the instructions in an operating system program than to the instructions in an applica-
tions system program." Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (copyrightability is not precluded if the copyrighted work is
put to a utilitarian use).
194 714 F.2d at 1252. To support its conclusion, the court referred to the CONTU
majority's finding that copyright practice "recognizes copyright protection for a work of
authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be put" and concluded "that the words
of a program are used ultimately in the implementation of a process should in no way
affect their copyrightability." Id. (quoting CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 21).
Accord Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 784.
195 714 F.2d at 1252.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 1253.
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court focused pragmatically on whether the underlying idea is capa-
ble of various modes of expression, reasoning that if only one of a
few other expressions are possible for a particular idea, the expres-
sion is "necessarily dictated by the underlying subject matter," and
therefore, the idea and expression have merged and are not pro-
tected by copyright.' 98 Although unable to decide the issue on the
record before it, the court established its own test for merger: "If
other programs can be written or created which perform the same
function as . . .Apple's operating system program, then that pro-
gram is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable."' 99
Finally, the court rejected Franklin's argument that regardless of
whether Apple's programs can be rewritten, granting them a copy-
right would be protecting an idea, because only a limited number of
ways exist "to arrange operating systems to enable a computer to
run the vast body of Apple-compatible software." ' 200 Holding that
the commercial and competitive objective of achieving total compati-
bility with Apple software is not to be considered when making an
idea/expression merger determination, the court stated that "the
idea which may merge with the expression, thus making the copy-
right unavailable, is the idea which is the subject of the expression,"
not the idea of how to arrange a particular operating system to ac-
commodate Apple-compatible software.20 '
Before Franklin could be heard on remand, the parties settled,
and the case was dismissed. 20 2 The merger question, however, was
considered in the appeal of the Formula case. 203 Affirming the dis-
trict court's decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled that copyright protec-
tion obtains for operating system computer programs under the
language of the Copyright Act, its legislative history, and case law.
Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, operating system programs are
copyrightable expressions of ideas, not uncopyrightable ideas or
processes. 20 4 The court again rejected Formula's contention that
programs are copyrightable if they interact directly with the com-
puter user, but not if they simply manage the computer system, stat-
ing that no such distinction exists under the copyright law. The
court found that the Act "makes no distinction between the
198 Id. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (st Cir.
1967); Freedman v. Grolier Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
199 Id. "In essence, this inquiry is no different than that made to determine whether
the expression and idea have merged, which has been stated to occur where there are no
or few other ways of expressing a particular idea." Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 In January 1984 the parties announced the settlement of Apple's suit for $2.5 mil-
lion. Franklin agreed also not to infringe Apple's copyrights in the future subject to
Franklin's right to dispose of its inventory. Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1984, at 10.
203 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
204 Id.
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copyrightability of those programs which directly interact with the
computer user and those which simply manage the computer sys-
tem." 20 5 Moreover, Congress considered and rejected excluding
protection for operating system programs when it extended copy-
right protection to all computer programs.20 6 The court also stated
that the Copyright Act has never "required that the expression be
communicated to a particular audience. ' 20 7
The court also answered the question left open by the Franklin
dismissal: whether operating system programs are ideas capable of
only one mode of expression. Applying the Franklin merger test, it
held that Apple's operating system programs are not uncopyright-
able ideas or processes, because there were numerous methods of
writing programs to perform the same functions.20 8 The court
found instead that Apple's operating programs are copyrightable ex-
pressions of an idea, because Apple's copyright only protects its par-
ticular set of operating instructions, and not the underlying
computer process. 20 9
V. Conclusion
These recent judicial decisions have strongly affirmed that com-
puter programs are proper subject matter of the copyright laws.
Courts have extended this protection to programs represented in
both source code and object code, to programs in ROM, and to op-
erating system programs as well as application programs. 2 10 The
copyrightability of computer programs in object code in ROM is
consistent with and supported by the 1976 Act, the 1980 Amend-
ments, and the attendant legislative history. 21' Computer programs
in ROM meet the statutory requirements of originality and fixation
205 Id. at 523-24.
206 Id. at 524.
207 Id. at 525.
208 Id. The district court had reached the same conclusion. See supra note 166 and
accompanying text. One witness testified at a CONTU meeting that a computer program
can be written in an infinite number of ways in principle and in hundreds of ways in prac-
tice. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 20 n. 108 (testimony of Dan McCracken, vice
president, Association for Computing Machinery). Because the ideas used in a computer
program can be expressed in several ways, copyright protection does not "threaten to
block the use of ideas or program language previously developed." Id. at 20. See M. NIM-
MER, supra note 37, § 2.18 [C][2], at 2-202 (no system or method can be performed with a
single form of expression).
209 Id.
210 See supra note 5.
211 Congress has taken further steps to ensure protection for new technologies. In
July 1984 a bill was introduced in the House to expand copyright protection for computer
software. H.R. 6024 would revise the definition of "computer program" and add new
definitions for "program description," "support material," and "computer software."
The amendment would define a "computer program" as "a set of instructions capable,
when incorporated in a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having informa-
tion processing capabilities to perform or achieve a particular function, task or result."
The amendment would also add "computer software" to the list of copyrightable subject
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in a tangible medium or form. The authorship of a computer pro-
gram in ROM is embodied in the programmer's original written
computer instructions. This authorship consists of the symbolic rep-
resentation of a set of instructions in a particular computer language.
This authorship expressed in "words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia" clearly falls within the Act's definition
of "literary work." 212 These representations include both the origi-
nal writing in the English-like form of source code and the ones and
zeroes of object code.213 The production of object code is merely
the mechanical transformation of source code into another computer
language.2 14 While the letters, numbers, and symbols of the various
program languages are dissimilar, the underlying expression remains
the same.2 15 Thus, a computer program should not lose copyright
protection as it proceeds through its developmental stages.
Computer programs in ROM also meet the statutory require-
ment of fixation. The definition of "copy" and the description of au-
thorship state that copyright protection subsists in authorship fixed
in a permanent and tangible medium of expression from which the
work "can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."2 16 The form
of the medium of expression of the authorship is irrelevant so long
as the program can be reproduced with the aid of a machine or de-
vice.21 7 Computer programs in ROM can be reproduced by printing
out its contents or displaying them on the computer's video terminal.
Thus, because computer programs in object code in ROM embody
original works of authorship and satisfy the statutory requirement of
fixation, they are a proper subject matter of copyright law.
Some commentators21 8 and courts219 argue that the proviso that
a work must be in a form from which it can be "perceived, repro-
matter in section 102 (b) of the Copyright Act. 1984 COPYRIGHr L. REP. (CCH) 20,271,
at 10,721-25.
On November 9, 1984, the President signed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984. The new Act defines "mask works" and "semiconductor products" and gives
owners exclusive rights to reproduce, import, and distribute mask works. The Act creates
a new form of protection separate from copyright protection that protects mask works
fixed in a semiconductor chip product for a ten-year period. The new Act also permits
reverse engineering. 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20,263, at 10,663-68.
212 Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
611,658.
213 Note, supra note 1, at 179.
214 Cf Mantle, Trade Secret and Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 4 COMPUTER LJ.
669, 682 (1982-83).
215 Davidson, supra note 212, at 667.
216 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982).
217 Davidson, supra note 212, at 662.
218 See, e.g., Stem, ROMs in Search of a Remedy: Can They Find It?, 1 COMPUTER L. REP. 4,
6-7 (1982).
219 Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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duced, or otherwise communicated" creates a requirement of direct
human intelligibility. That is, a work must be intended to communi-
cate the author's original expression directly to the human senses to
qualify as a protected copy under the statute. This interpretation is
incorrect for several reasons. First, it is inconsistent with prior copy-
right practice. The Copyright Act extends protection to many works
that were not intended to communicate any original expression.
Compilations of facts, such as telephone directories, that are in-
tended to convey only factual data to the user, are copyrightable 220
even though the facts themselves are not original, copyrightable ex-
pressions. 22' Moreover, other works that convey no expression at all
have been copyrighted so long as the original authorship subsists in
the work itself.22 2
Second, the human intelligibility requirement misconstrues the
language of the statute. The Act does not require a copy to be com-
municative. The fixation requirement and the definition of "copy,"
phrased in the disjunctive, require only that a work be capable of
being "perceived, reproduced, or otherwide communicated
.... 223 Reproduction is sufficient; communication and percep-
tion are not required.224 Works can be reproduced from ROMs with
the aid of a machine or device. A computer easily can reproduce a
copy of the object code in ROM by printing it out or displaying it on
a video terminal. These expressions are sufficient reproductions, be-
cause there is no requirement within the statute that the reproduc-
tion be in the same medium of expression. 225 Moreover, even if the
statutory language were interpreted to require communication to
humans, it would be satisfied, because skilled programmers are capa-
ble of understanding computer programs written in object code.226
Third, the view that copyright protects only works intended to
communicate an original expression to humans wrongly forces a
computer program to qualify as both an audiovisual work and a liter-
ary work. 2 27 These are two separate categories of copyrightable
works of authorship, and there is no basis under the statute for re-
quiring that a literary work produce any output to receive copyright
220 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "compilation").
221 Note, supra note 4, at 1730. See Morse v. Fields, 127 F. Supp. 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
222 See Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (compila-
tion of coined words used to create private codes); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v.
Graphics Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (optical scanning sheets).
223 17 U.S.C' §§ 101, 102 (1982).
224 Brooks, Object Code in ROM: Is It Really a Problem?, in COMPtrrER LAW INsTrrtrE
335, 359-60 (P.L.I. 1983). See also Davidson, supra note 212, at 653; Note, supra note 4, at
1731.
225 See Davidson, supra note 212, at 662-63, 675.
226 Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY LJ. 483, 511
(1981).
227 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
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protection.22 8 Thus, a computer program in ROM need not produce
any output; it is sufficient that the original written program it embod-
ies is found to consist of authorship. 229
Finally, the human intelligibility argument ignores the legislative
intent and statutory construction of the 1976 Act. The legislative
history shows that Congress intended to protect all computer pro-
grams as literary works regardless of their medium or form and over-
rule the White-Smith requirement of human perception. 230 In
addition, the statutory phrases, "with the aid of a machine or de-
vice," "now known or later developed," and "by any method" repre-
sent Congress' intent to protect new forms of expression created by
technological advances. 23'
Some litigants have argued that because object code in ROM
can be used directly in a computer, it is a machine part protected by
patent not copyright law. This argument misconstrues what the
copyright protects, because it fails to distinguish the medium of ex-
pression from the work of authorship contained therein. Copyright
prohibits only the copying of the writing stored within the mechani-
cal medium; it does not protect the medium itself. Computer pro-
grams are symbolic, not mechanical. Although ROMs are used in
conjunction with machines, they contain writings that are separate
and exist independently from the chip itself. These works of author-
ship Congress intended to protect, not the particular mechanical
configuration embodying the writing.232 Section 202 of the 1976 Act
codifies this distinction between copyright in the work of authorship
and the material object that embodies the work. 2 33
Furthermore, the extension of copyright to computer programs
in ROM is analogous to copyright of programs on magnetic tapes
and disks, which are mentioned as copies and fixations by Con-
gress. 234 The form of embodiment is irrelevant: copyright protec-
tion depends only on whether the material object embodies an
original work of authorship.
Copyright protection for object code in ROM is also implicit in
the 1980 amendment, which defines a "computer program" as "a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
228 Davidson, supra note 212, at 674; Note, supra note 4, at 1732.
229 See Stern Elecs. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), afd, 669 F.2d 852
(2d Cir. 1982).
230 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
231 Brooks, supra note 224, at 359. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 877.
232 See Rodau, supra note 66, at 548 (ROM is not a machine part or utilitarian object, it
is merely a device that embodies copyrightable subject matter).
233 The Act's legislative history notes: "The principle restated in section 202 is a fun-
damental and important one: that copyright ownership and ownership of a material object
in which the copyrighted work is embodied are entirely separate things." HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 35, at 124, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5739.
234 Brooks, supra note 224, at 365.
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computer in order to bring about a certain result." 235 This defini-
tion is functional rather than formal; "[i]t does not define computer
program with respect to a certain form of the program or a certain
type of program. '23 6 It requires only that a certain function be per-
formed. This definition naturally includes object code in ROMs that
are used directly in a computer.
Other litigants have asserted that computer programs in ROM
are useful articles, and that to extend copyright protection would re-
sult in a monopoly of the art or idea embodied in the work. Copy-
right protection extends only to the particular expression of an idea,
not to the idea itself.2 37 The useful article doctrine encompasses
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" and provides that such
works are copies only to the extent that they embody separate copy-
rightable features. 238 This doctrine, however, does not apply to
computer programs that are literary, not pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural works.23 9 Thus, any such analysis is inappropriate in the case
of computer programs in ROM.
A final argument is that computer programs in ROM are
processes, systems, or methods of operation that are not copyright-
able. This argument again misconstrues the scope of copyright. The
programmer's expression is the only copyrightable element of a
computer program and the actual processes or methods employed
by the program are not covered by copyright law.2 40 The program-
mer's expression is not the process, but a symbolic representation of
the process. It represents how the process or method of operation
will proceed when the program is executed, but it is not the process
or method of operation itself.24 1
Failure to extend copyright protection to computer programs in
ROM would severely limit protection to all forms of computer pro-
grams. The purpose of the 1976 Act and 1980 amendment was to
extend copyright protection to all computer programs regardless of
their form or function. Copyright protection of computer programs
in ROM reflects Congress' "receptivity to new technologies and its
desire to encourage through the copyright laws, continued imagina-
tion and creativity in computer programming. ' 242 Protection of
ROMs is not a corruption of copyright law; ROMs merely represent
another in the series of advances in communications technology
which has resulted in the continual expansion of the number of
235 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of "computer program").
236 Davidson, supra note 212, at 654-55.
237 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
238 See id. § 101 (definition of "useful article").
239 Brooks, supra note 224, at 363; Davidson, supra note 212, at 672.
240 Rodau, supra note 66, at 547.
241 Davidson, sura note 212, at 660.
242 Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253-54. See also Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 783.
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forms of expression or media included as copyrightable subject
matter.
-ANDREW COGDELL

